Out of the Shadows: Defining  Known to the Government  in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 by Stine, Carl
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 11, Issue 3 1987 Article 7
Out of the Shadows: Defining “Known to the
Government” in the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986
Carl Stine∗
∗
Copyright c©1987 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Out of the Shadows: Defining “Known to the
Government” in the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986
Carl Stine
Abstract
This Note argues that these rules contradict the language and purposes of the Act. Part I of
this Note examines the rules promulgated by the INS defining “known to the Government.” Part
II discusses the only reported case to dispute that definition and analyzes Chevron U.S.A., INc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the governing Supreme Court decision regarding
judicial review of a government agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers. Part III
uses the Chevron test to analyze the INS’s rules defining ”known to the Government.” This Note
concludes that the INS should adopt a broader definition that conforms with the plain meaning of
the statutory language and is consistent with the purposes of the legalization provision.
OUT OF THE SHADOWS: DEFINING "KNOWN TO THE
GOVERNMENT" IN THE IMMIGRATION
REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986
INTRODUCTION
Under the weight of a growing illegal alien population, the
United States Congress amended the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act' ("the INA") by passing the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 19862 ("the Act"). The Act provides for,
among other things, a one-time amnesty, or legalization, 3 of
certain illegal aliens.4 Specifically, one section of the Act al-
lows for the legalization of authorized nonimmigrants-tem-
porary students, for example 5-if their visas expired before
January 1, 1982, or if they violated the terms of their visas and
their illegal status was "known to the Government as of such
date."6
In the final rules implementing this section of the Act, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") published its
definition of the phrase "known to the Government."' 7 It
stated that "Government" means the INS.' Additionally, the
rules recognize four restrictive circumstances in which an
1. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-
1184, 1185-1353a, 1353d-1525, 1552 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988)).
2. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3359
(codified at scattered sections of 7, 8, 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
3. Although "amnesty" is the popular term, both sponsors of the Act (Senator
Alan K. Simpson and Representative Romano L. Mazzoli) emphasize that the legali-
zation provision is not an "amnesty." A "legalization" mandates specific criteria for
the attainment of legal status, while an "amnesty" usually implies that mere applica-
tion is the only requirement. Miller, "The Right Thing to Do." A. Histoty of Simpson-
Mlazzoli, in CLAMOR AT THE GATES: THE NEW AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 321 n.8 (N.
Glazer ed. 1985).
4. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 sec. 201, § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a (Supp. IV 1986). The Act also provides for strict penalties against employ-
ers who knowingly employ undocumented aliens, id. sec. 101(a)(l), § 274A(f), 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (Supp. IV 1986), and a revision of the regulations under which
foreign agricultural workers can enter and work in the United States, id. secs. 301-
305, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) at 3411-34 (codified at scat-
tered sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C.).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(F)(i) (1982); see also infra note 19.
6. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 sec. 201, § 245A(a)(2)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
7. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) (1988).
8. See id.
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alien's unlawful status can be "known to the Government.'''
This Note argues that these rules contradict the language and
purposes of the Act. Part I of this Note examines the rules
promulgated by the INS defining "known to the Government."
Part II discusses the only reported case to dispute that defini-
tion ° and analyzes Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.," the governing Supreme Court decision re-
garding judicial review of a government agency's interpreta-
tion of a statute that it administers. Part III uses the Chevron
test to analyze the INS's rules defining "known to the Govern-
ment." This Note concludes that the INS should adopt a
broader definition that conforms with the plain meaning of the
statutory language and is consistent with the purposes of the
legalization provision.
I. THE INS'S RULES DEFINING "KNOWN
TO THE GOVERNMENT"
Estimates of the number of illegal aliens now living in the
United States range from two to twelve million." Congress
has recognized that a large number of these people have been
in the United States many years and have established strong
ties to their communities.1 3 Moreover, they have contributed
to the United States in many ways: they have shared their tal-
ents, provided their labor, and paid taxes.' 4 However, because
they live in the United States illegally, they are often afraid to
seek help when they become ill or when they are victimized by
employers, landlords, or criminals.' 5
The legalization provision of the Act was intended to le-
galize an eligible segment of this group, thus allowing them to
9. See id.; infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
10. Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
11. 467 U.S. 837 (1984), revg Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gor-
such, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
12. E. HARWOOD, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW 1 (1986); see also BUREAU OF NAT'I, AF-
FAIRS, INC., IMMIGRATION REFORM: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 3 (1987) (the Census Bureau
estimates between three and five million). See generally Corwin, The Nunibers Game:
Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 1970-1981, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1982, at 223 (discusses the different methods for counting the illegal alien
population).
13. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 49 [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT], reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653.
14. Id.
15. Id.; E. HARWOOD, supra note 12, at 18.
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contribute openly to society. 6 In addition, decreasing the
number of illegal aliens would free the INS to use its resources
more appropriately in the prevention of future illegal immigra-
tion to the United States.
17
Section 245A(a)(2)(B) of the INA"8 addresses the situation
of aliens who were admitted to the United States as authorized
nonimmigrants"' and whose status subsequently became un-
lawful before January 1, 1982, either because their visas ex-
pired ° or because they violated the terms of their visas.2' In
its final rules implementing this section of the legalization pro-
vision, the INS defined "known to the Government" in this
context as "known to the INS" and provided four ways that an
alien's unlawful status could be "known." 22
16. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, pt. 1, at 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 5653.
17. Id.
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 245A, as a whole, pro-
vides for the adjustment of certain aliens from unlawful status to temporary resident
status. There are four general requirements for this adjustment: timely application,
continuous unlawful residence sinceJanuary 1, 1982, continuous physical presence
since the enactment of the Act, and admissibility as an immigrant. Id. § 1255a. Sub-
section (a)(2)(B) deals with the unique situation ofnonimmigrants within the context
of the continuous unlawful residency requirement. Id. § 1255a(a)(2)(B).
19. For examples of where authorized nonimmigrants appear, see, e.g., id.
§ 1101(a)(15)(B)(1982) (visitor for business or pleasure); id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)
(Supp. IV 1986) (temporary worker of distinguished merit and ability); id.
§ 1 101(a)(15)(K) (1982) (fiance(e) of United States citizen); id. § I 101(a)(15)(L)
(Supp. IV 1986) (intra-company transferee); id. § 1 101(a)(15)(M) (Supp. IV 1986)
(vocational student).
20. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245A(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B)
(Supp. IV 1986).
21. Id.
22. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(d) (1988). The rules provide as follows:
An alien's unlawful status was "known to the government" only if:
(1) The Service received factual information constituting a violation of
the alien's nonimmigrant status from any agency, bureau or department, or
subdivision thereof, of the Federal government, and such information was
stored or otherwise recorded in the official Service alien file, whether or not
the Service took follow-up action on the information received. In order to
meet the standard of "information constituting a violation of the alien's
nonimmigrant status," the alien must have made a clear statement or decla-
ration to the other federal agency, bureau or department that he or she was
in violation of nonimmigrant status; or
(2) An affirmative determination was made by the Service prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1982 that the alien was subject to deportation proceedings. Evi-
dence that may be presented by an alien to support an assertion that such a
determination was made may include, but is not limited to, official Service
documents issued prior to January 1, 1982, i.e., Forms 1-94, Arrival-Depar-
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First, an alien's unlawful status could be "known to the
Government" if any branch of the federal government re-
ported to the INS that the alien had violated the terms of his
visa and the INS had a record of this violation in the alien's
official INS file.2 3 In addition, the alien must have made a clear
statement or declaration to the other branch that he was violat-
ing his visa.2 4 The second way an alien's unlawful status could
be "known to the Government" is if the INS made an "affirma-
tive determination" that the alien was subject to deportation. 5
The third rule promulgated by the INS provides that an alien's
illegal status can be "known to the Government" if the INS
had advised another agency that the alien had no legal status in
the United States or that no record could be found for him.2 6
The fourth rule is intended "to correct technicalities and pro-
vide additional guidance."' 27 Under this rule, if an alien under
a temporary student visa produces documentation showing
ture Records granting a period of time in which to depart the United States
without imposition of proceedings; Forms 1-210, Voluntary Departure No-
tice letter; and Forms 1-221, Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing.
Evidence from Service records that may be used to support a finding that
such a determination was made may include, but is not limited to, record
copies of the aforementioned forms and other documents contained in alien
files, i.e., Forms 1-213, Record of deportable Alien;
Unexecuted Forms 1-205, Warrant of Deportation; Forms 1-265, Appli-
cation for Order to Show Cause and Processing Sheet; Forms 1-54 1, Order
of Denial of Application for Extension of Stay granting a period of time in
which to depart the United States without imposition of proceedings, or an
other Service record reflecting that the alien's nonimmigrant status was con-
sidered by the Service to have terminated or the alien was otherwise deter-
mined to be subject to deportation proceedings prior to January 1, 1982,
whether or not deportation proceedings were instituted; or
(3) A copy of a response by the Service to any other agency which ad-
vised that agency that a particular alien had no legal status in the United
States or for whom no record could be found.
(4) The applicant produces documentation from a school approved to en-
roll foreign students under § 214.3 which establishes that the said school
forwarded to the Service a report that clearly indicated the applicant had
violated his or her nonimmigrant student status prior to January I, 1982. In
order to be eligible under this part, the applicant must not have been rein-
stated to nonimmigrant student status.
Id. (indentation error in original).
23. Id. § 245a. l(d)(1).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 245a.l(d)(2).
26. Id. § 245a. l(d)(3).
27. Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,843. 43,843
(1987).
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that his school sent a report to the INS indicating that the alien
had violated his visa, the alien's unlawful status was "known to
the Government. 2 8
While the first two rules were under proposal,' the INS
received ninety-one comments in response to their publication
in the Federal Register. 3" These comments unanimously
stated that the proposed definition of "known to the Govern-
ment" was too restrictive; 3' nevertheless, the INS remained
committed to its interpretation 2.3  Its rationale for not ex-
panding the meaning of "Government" beyond "the INS" was
that administration of the section would then become ex-
tremely difficult and that other governmental agencies would
be vested with authority specifically reserved for the INS.33
II. THE FARZAD DECISION AND THE CHEVRON
DEFERENCE TEST
As of March 15, 1988, the only litigation concerning the
INS's regulations defining "known to the Government" arose
in Farzad v. Chandler, a recent district court case from the Dallas
division of the Northern District of Texas.3 4 This litigation re-
lied on a Supreme Court case that established the test for
whether or not an agency's interpretation of a statute that it
administers will receive deference.
A. The Farzad Decision
In Farzad, the petitioner, Masoud Farzad, a native of Iran,
entered the United States on September 19, 1976, as an au-
thorized nonimmigrant student.3 6 Under his visa and subse-
28. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d)(4).
29. See 52 Fed. Reg. 8754, 8754 (1987).




33. Id. Subsequently, the INS added two other equally restrictive rules that ex-
panded the way an alien's status could be "known." See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,208, 16,208
(1987) (adding third rule); 52 Fed. Reg. 43,845, 43,845 (1987) (adding fourth rule);
see also supra note 22 (text of final rules).
34. Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
35. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
36. 670 F. Supp. at 691. Farzad entered under the authorization of 8 U.S.C.
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quent extensions he was authorized to stay in the United States
until June 1, 1982V' Between December 1980 and April 1982,
Farzad engaged in unauthorized employment, thereby violat-
ing the terms of his visa and making him subject to deporta-
tionY3 Although previous to January 1, 1982, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") and the Social Security Administra-
tion knew of Farzad's employment,3 9 it is unclear exactly when
the INS originally suspected that he was violating his visa. The
INS first verified its suspicion in March 1982 by writing to
Farzad's employer. 40  Between that time and January 1987
Farzad engaged in various legal proceedings aimed at prevent-
ing deportation."1
On January 23, 1987, after all appeals had been ex-
hausted, Farzad applied to the INS for a stay of deportation
based on the Act's amnesty provision.42 A week later, his ap-
plication was denied, and he was sent a notice to report in ten
days for deportation.4 3 On February 5, Farzad filed a petition
with the district court for a writ of habeas corpus,4 4 initiating
the action that would culminate with the court's memorandum
order of September 22, 1987. 45
The only substantive issue before the district court was
whether Farzad's unlawful status was "known to the Govern-




39. Id. at 694.
40. Id. at 691.
41. Id. On August 24, 1984, Farzad's application for political asylum and sus-
pension of deportation was denied; his application for voluntary departure from the
United States was granted. Id. On January 27, 1986, Farzad's appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals was dismissed. Id. After petitioning the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Board of Immigration Appeal's decision was af-
firmed on October 10, 1986. Farzad v. INS, 802 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1986). OnJanu-
ary- 15, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied Farzad's petition for rehearing and sug-
gestion for rehearing en banc. Farzad v. INS, 808 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1987).
42. 670 F. Supp. at 691.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 691 n. 1. The court's subject matter jurisdiction with regard to habeas
corpus was disputed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") because
Farzad was not in custody. Id. The court held that the "INS' order that [Farzad]
appear for deportation [was] sufficient to satisfy the 'in custody' requirement for
habeas relief." Id. The court held that subject matter jurisdiction existed. Id.
45. Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
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ment" as ofJanuary 1, 1982."' The INS argued that "the'Gov-
ernment" can mean only the Attorney General or the INS47
because they have the exclusive responsibility for administer-
ing the Act.48 The INS also contended that "known" means
that the INS "had information in its official file revealing an
alien's unlawful status or that it had already made a determina-
tion of deportability."4 9 The INS asserted that while another
federal agency may have evidence of a nonimmigrant's activity,
"it cannot know whether such activity amounts to unlawful sta-
tus unless it consults with the INS." 50
Farzad argued that "known to the Government" means
that beforeJanuary 1, 1982, one or more departments or agen-
cies of the federal government had information indicating his
unlawful status.5 ' Farzad reasoned that because the IRS and
the Social Security Administration had information in their
records that indicated that he had been unlawfully employed
beforeJanuary 1, 1982, he should be eligible for legalization.5"
The district court in Farzad applied the analysis of the
Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. , which governs judicial review of a government agency's
interpretation of a statute that it administers. In a short mem-
orandum order, the Farzad court held that because Congress
freely used the words "INS" and "Attorney General" through-
out the Act, it could not have intended that the meaning of
"Government" be so narrow as to include only the INS or the
Attorney General, 54 and that it is at least broad enough to in-
clude the IRS or the Social Security Administration. 5 The
46. Id. at 692.
47. Id. at 693. The final rules say that "the Government" means the INS. See 8
C.F.R. § 245a. 1 (d) (1988). There is no conflict between the final rules and the INS's
argument because the Attorney General is directly responsible for the administration
of the INS. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
48. 670 F. Supp. at 693; see 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
49. 670 F. Supp. at 694.
50. Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings or to
Alter or Amend Judgment at 2, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex.
1987) (Civ. A. No. CA 3-87-0256-G) (emphasis in original).
51. 670 F. Supp. at 692-93.
52. Id. at 694. For other requirements for eligibility, see supra note 18 and ac-
companying text.
53. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. 670 F. Supp. at 693.
55. Id. at 694.
1988]
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court further held that the INS's interpretation of "known" is
not plausible because it "denies coverage to virtually every
alien it was intended to reach." 56
B. Chevron and its Progeny
In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,.' the
Supreme Court considered whether the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") properly defined two words in the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977.58 In so doing, the Court unani-
mously enunciated a two-part test for reviewing a federal
agency's construction of a statute that it administers. If "the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress'' is clear, it must
be given effect. 59 However, if the statute is "silent or ambigu-
ous with respect to the specific issue," the agency's interpreta-
tion will be given deference if it is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute. 60
What is to be considered a permissible construction of a
statute will depend on whether the gap, or silence, in the stat-
ute was explicit or implicit. 6 ' An explicit gap occurs when
56. Id.
57. 467 U.S. 837.
58. Id. at 840. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685, requires certain states to regulate " 'new or modified major stationary
sources,' of air pollution." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)
(1982)). In its regulations implementing this act, the EPA adopted a broad, plant-
wide, definition of the term "stationary source." Id. (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.18(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (1983) (re-designated 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (1987))).
After taking into account the legislative history and the specific statutory language at
issue, the Chevron Court concluded that Congress did not have specific intent as to
the disputed words and that the EPA's definition was reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 863-64.
59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
60. Id. at 843. The concept ofjudicial deference to an agency's construction has
its detractors. ProfessorJaffe wrote:
A judge may say: "There is more than one sensible construction of this
statute, but this construction appears to me to be the correct one." If this is
what he thinks, he should not defer either to his colleagues or to the agency
.... Such a view comports better with a confident and responsible judiciary.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 576 (1965). One author has
even suggested that judicial deference is difficult to square with Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 87, I Cranch 137 (1803). Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in .Idnistrative
Law, 74 GEo. LJ. 1, 39 (1985). In a 1984 opinion, Justice Blackmun warned that
"deference is not to be a device that emasculates the significance of judicial review."
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137,
142-43 (1984).
61. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
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Congress intentionally leaves an issue in the legislation un-
resolved and specifically instructs the appropriate agency to
promulgate rules that address the issue.62 In such a case, the
agency's interpretation will be given deference unless it is "ar-
bitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. ' ' 63 In
contrast, Congress creates an implicit gap when it leaves no
specific instructions in the legislation.6 4 Where'there is an im-
plicit gap, the agency's interpretation must be reasonable.65
An interpretation will be considered reasonable "unless it ap-
pears from the statute or its legislative history that the accom-
modation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned."-6 6
Since the Chevron decision, this analysis has been used nu-
merous times to review regulations and interpretations of stat-
utes promulgated by, among others, the Federal Reserve
Board, 67 the Secretary of Agriculture,68 the Federal Drug Ad-
ministration,69 the Merit Systems Protection Board,7 ° the Sec-
62. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 245A(g)(l), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(g)(l) (Supp. IV 1986) ("The Attorney General ... shall prescribe . . . (A)
regulations establishing a definition of the term 'resided continuously', as used in this
section .... ); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (West Supp. 1988) (providing that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services shall determine standards of eligibility for a
state medical assistance plan).
63. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see, e.g., Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 162 (1986)
(invoking the "arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute" standard in a Chevron
analysis of the Secretary of Health and Human Service's interpretation of an "ex-
plicit" statute); Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d
501, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute" standard
used in reviewing an FCC interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982), which al-
lows agency discretion in revocation of a television station's license for failing to al-
low reasonable access to federal political candidates).
64. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961));
accord United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985)
("reasonable, in light of the language, policies, and legislative history of the Act").
67. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
474 U.S. 361 (1986). The Court used the Chevron analysis, see id. at 368, and held that
the Federal Reserve Board incorrectly defined "banks." Id. at 374.
68. See Biggs v. Lyng, 823 F.2d 15, 18-20 (2d Cir. 1987). The Chevron analysis
was used to review the Secretary of Agriculture's definition of "loan" under 7
U.S.C.A. § 2014(d)(4) (West Supp. 1987) (7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(4) (Supp. IV 1986)) as
applied lo New York's Home Relief' program. Id.
69. See Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986). The Court
used a Chevron analysis to review the Federal Drug Administration's interpretation of
a clause in the Federal Food, l)rug and Cosmetic Act. Id. at 980.
70. See Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985). Deference was given to the Merit
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retary of Health and Human Services,7' and the Environmental
Protection Agency.72 The decisions of these courts demon-
strate "the continuing and unchanged vitality" of the Chevron
test.
73
III. APPLYING CHEVRON TO "KNOWN
TO THE GOVERNMENT"
Under a Chevron analysis, the plain meaning and context of
the phrase "known to the Government" unambiguously reveal
that Congress intended a broader interpretation than was sup-
plied by the INS. 74 This clear intent should be given effect.
However, even if a court finds the congressional intent ambig-
uous, the INS's interpretation is unreasonable because it is in-
consistent with the purposes behind the legalization provision
of the Act.75
A. Congressional Intent
Where the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it
seizes everything from which aid can be derived.
John Marshall 
76
When applying the Chevron two-part analysis 77 to the INS's
definition of "known to the Government," a court must first
determine whether there is an "unambiguously expressed in-
tent of Congress." 78 If there is that clear intent, it must be
Systems Protection Board's interpretation of "harmful error" in the Civil Service Re-
form Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A) (1982).
71. See Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524
(1984). Citing Chevron, the Court deferred to the Secretary of Health and Human
Service's interpretation of a phrase from the Medicaid Act. Id. at 530-31 n.16.
72. See American Mining Congress v. United States EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). The court held EPA's definition of "discarded" to be inconsistent with
Congressional intent. Id. at 1193.
73. NIRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. 413. 426
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("our decision demonstrates the continuing and tn-
changed vitality of the test for judicial review of agency determinations of law set
forth in Chevron").
74. Farzad v. Chandler. 670 F. Stipp. 690. 694 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
75. Id.
76. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 214,230, 2 Cranch 358,386 (1805) (Marshall.
c.)
77. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.. 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984).
78. Id.
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given effect.7" The Chevron Court further refined this require-
ment by mandating that "traditional tools of statutory con-
struction" be employed to determine that intent. 80
The first consideration in every case involving statutory
construction is the words themselves; 8 ' and the presumption is
that the ordinary use of those words is the meaning to be at-
tributed to, them.8 2 Section 245A(a)(2)(B) of the INA states
that the alien's unlawful status must have been "known to the
Government.""3 It does not say "known to the INS" or "known
to the Attorney General" or any other subdivision of the fed-
eral government." The word "Government" is not ordinarily
used to mean only the INS.8 5 Furthermore, "to know" is vari-
ously defined as "to perceive," 8 6 "to be aware of,"87 or "to
possess information." '88 The ordinary usage of these terms
should thus simply mean that to qualify under section
245A(a)(2)(B), prior to January 1, 1982, the federal govern-
ment must have possessed some information documenting8 9
79. Id.
80. Id. at 843 n.9.
81. Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353, 358 (1986).
82. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2585 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring);
Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 722
(1982).
83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added); see also
supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing § 245A).
84. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 245A(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a
(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986); see also in/a text accompanying notes 97-98 (discussing
relation of agencies to the federal government).
85. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 529 (1987) (defines,
"Government" (with a capital "G") as "the executive branch of the U.S. federal gov-
ernment").
The use of a dictionary to show the ordinary meaning or common usage of a
word is well established. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct.
2022, 2027 (1987) (citing various dictionaries to help define "race"); Lukhard v.
Reed, 107 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12 (1987) ("income"); United States v.James, 106 S. Ct.
3116, 3121 n.6 (1986) ("damages"); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 n.6
(1985) ("policy"); United States v. Rodgers. 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984) ("jurisdic-
tion").
86. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 489 (1980). See generally supra note 85 (giving
examples of recent Supreme Court cases that use dictionary definitions to establish
common usage).
87. Id.
88. BLACK'S I.AW DICTIONARY 784 (5th ed. 1979). See gen'rall) spra note 85 (giv-
ing examples of recent Supreme Court cases thai use dictionary definitions to estab-
lish common usage).
89. See in/a text accompanying notes 114-15.
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the alien's illegal status. 0
There is also a presumption that the same word or phrase
has the same meaning throughout a statute.9 ' The word "Gov-
ernment" or "government" appears twenty-two times within
the Act. Twelve times it appears with a capital "G": six of
those times it is directly modified by the word "Federal" (i.e.,
"Federal Government"), 92 three times it appears with the word
"agencies" (i.e., "Government agencies" or "agencies of Gov-
ernment"), one time it surfaces as "United States Govern-
ment,'' ' and the other two times, it appears in the disputed
form-"known to the Government."94  When "government"
(lower case "g") appears in the Act, it is referring to "state or
local government" or generally to the federal government,
state or local governments, or their agencies. 5 It would seem
that when Congress specifically used a capital "G," its intent
was to include the whole federal government. 96 Furthermore,
90. See infra text accompanying notes 132-38.
91. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941); Barnson v.
United States, 816 F.2d 549, 554 (10th Cir. 1987); Doctors Hosp, Inc. v. Bowen, 811
F.2d 1448, 1452 (lth Cir. 1987); Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theorv of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons Abont How Statutes Are To Be Constrned, in 4 SUTHERLAND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION 133, 138 (C. Sands ed. 1975).
92. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3359,
at 3373 (twice), 3404, 3405, 3406, 3432.
93. 1d. at 3364, 3401, 3411.
94. Id. at 3395, 3443. The second occurrence of the disputed phrase appears in
Title V of the Act, which deals with the cost of incarcerating illegal aliens:
(b) ILLEGAL ALIENS CONVICTED OF A FELONY.-An illegal alien
referred to in subsection (a) is an alien who is any alien convicted of a felony
who is in the United States unlawfully and-
(1) whose most recent entry into the United States was without in-
spection, or
(2) whose most recent admission to the United States was as a non-
immigrant and-
(A) whose period of authorized stay as a nonimmigrant ex-
pired, or
(B) whose unlawful status was known to the Government, before
the date of the commission of the crime for which the alien is con-
victed.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 501 (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (Supp. IV
1986) (emphasis added). There are no regulations or case law construing this por-
tion of the Act, but because the context is so similar to § 245A(a)(2)(B) of the Imi-
gration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986), it illus-
trates that use of this general language was intentional.
95. Pub. I. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. CoiE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 3359,
at 3374 (twice), 3410, 3411, 3419, 3424 (twice). 3440, 3441, 3442.
96. In its linal rules, the INS inexplicably changed "known to the Government'
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to substitute "INS" for "Government" in any of these contexts
deprives the language of its meaning by creating, for example,
"United States INS" or "INS agencies."
The INS, under the supervision of the Attorney General,
is an agency under the terms of the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). 7 The APA defines an agency as an "authority of
the Government of the United States, ' 98 and therefore a sub-
set of the federal government. By defining "known to the Gov-
ernment" as "known to the INS," the INS is, in effect, substi-
tuting a small subset for the set itself.99
In the Act, Congress chose to be more specific than "Gov-
ernment" many times: the Act employs the words "the Attor-
ney General" 154 times and speaks of "the Immigration and
Naturalization Service," "the Service," or "the INS" forty-
nine times.' °° Throughout the Act, when Congress wanted to
give responsibilities to other agencies, departments, or individ-
uals, it specifically did so. For example, the Act expressly re-
(capital "G") to read "known to the government" (lower case "g"), thus altering the
meaning of the phrase. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) (1988).
97. Koden v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 564 F.2d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 1977);
Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
98. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(l), 701(b)(l) (1982).
99. American Immigration Lawyers Association, Position Paper: "known to the
Government" Issue, 111-4 (undated) [hereinafter AILA], included in Supplement to Pe-
titioner's Reply to Respondent's Response to Order to Show Cause, Etc., Dated Feb-
ruary 13, 1987, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (Civ. A. No.
CA 3-87-0256-G) (available at the Fordham International Law Journal office); B. Bates,
Comments of Proposed Regulations for the Legalization Program 3 (undated memo-
randum prepared on behalf of the North Texas Immigration Coalition) [hereinafter
VTICI, included in Petitioner's Third Supplement to Petition at MI, M3, Farzad v.
Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (Civ. A. No. CA 3-87-0256-G) (avail-
able at the Fordhan International Law Journal office) (Mr. Bates was counsel for Peti-
tioner in Faizad); Memorandum fromJackie Burger to Lucas Guttentag, National Lit-
igation Coordinator for the American Civil Liberties Union Immigration and Aliens
Rights Task Force at 7 (Jan. 11, 1988) [hereinafter ACLU] (available at the Fordhanm
Internaltional La' Journal office) (regarding "known to the Government").
The ACLU and the AILA were two of the organizations that filed an anici brief in
Far:ad in support of petitioner. The ACLU's interest in the case was in its commit-
ment to the equal and fair application of the laws and the Constitution to all persons,
including illegal aliens. Brief ofAmici Curiae in Support-of Petitioner at 1, Farzad v.
Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (Civ. A. No. CA 3-87-0256-G) (avail-
able at the Fordiani International Law journal office). The AILA's members practice
and teach immigration law and therefore are directly affected by any new develop-
tnents regarding the legalization provision. Id.
100. See Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.)
3359 passim.
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fers to, among others, the Comptroller General," °" the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission,0 2 the Department of
Labor,' the Federal Maritime Commission, 0 4 the Depart-
ment of State,1'0 5 the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices,""' the Secretary of Agriculture, 0 7 and the Director of the
Bureau of Census. 10 8
By analyzing the statutory construction, it is clear that the
Congressional intent behind the use of the phrase "known to
the Government" is unambiguously broader than the INS's
narrow interpretation. 0 9 Under a Chevron analysis, that deter-
mination would be "the end of the matter."' 0 But, assuming a
court found the intent to be ambiguous, Chevron requires that a
second question be asked: Is the INS's interpretation "based
on a permissible construction of the statute"?..
B. A Permissible Construction?
Because Congress did not give specific instructions as to
the meaning of "known to the Government," the INS's defini-
tion will be considered reasonable-and therefore will be
given judicial deference-unless the statute or its legislative
history reveals that Congress would not have sanctioned this
definition.
1. The Purpose Behind the "known to
the Government" Requirement
If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some
assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose
or objective, is nonsense.
Karl Llewellyn 112
101. Id. at 3379.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 3381.
104. Id. at 3383.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 3406.
107. Id. at 3422.
108. Id. at 3430.
109. Although "known to the Government" is a broad, general phrasc,
"[b]road, general language [in a statutel is not necessarily ambiguous when congres-
sional objectives require broad terms." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. 315
(1980).
110. Chevron U.S.A.. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984).
I1l. Id. a( 843.
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Although Congress did not articulate a purpose behind
the "known to the Government" requirement,"13 it was gener-
ally concerned throughout the Act with the possibility of fraud-
ulent documentation." 4 A reading of section 245A(a) (2) (B) of
the INA within the context of the entire legalization provision
supports the assumption that the purpose behind this clause is
to require governmental objectivity with respect to a nonimmi-
grant's documentation, thus ensuring a high level of reliability
and minimizing the possibility of fraud." 5
The INS contends that "known to the Government"
means "known to the INS""' 6 because only the INS is respon-
sible for the administration and enforcement of the Act.' '7 But
if the purpose of the phrase is to ensure reliable documenta-
tion that the nonimmigrant was in an unlawful status as ofJan-
uary 1, 1982, then evidence of the unlawful status in the pos-
session of any federal agency or department would ensure that
reliability. In addition, when Congress has required that a spe-
cific agency or individual have knowledge of some fact, it has
explicitly articulated that requirement. 18
The INS further contends that because it is the agency re-
sponsible for the administration of the Act, it is the only
agency capable of making a determination whether or not the
nonimmigrant's status is unlawful." 9 But the Act does not re-
112. Llewelvn, supra note 91, at 135.
113. But cf The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Report
76 (U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest, Joint Committee hearings,
Print No. 8, 1981). In its section on Eligibility for Legalization, the Select Committee
specifically mentioned nonimmigrants in violation of their visas: "For visa abusers
• . . the period of continuous residency should begin at the time of visa abuse." Id.
(emphasis added).
114. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1160(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1986) (proof of eligibility for spe-
cial agricultural workers); 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (Supp. IV 1986) ("Fraud and misuse of'
visas, permits, and other documents"); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, pt. 1, at
73, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5677 (the definition of "con-
tinuous residence" should "ensure the integrity of the documentation process while
minimizing the incidence of fraud").
115. 4CI.U, supra note 99, at 14.
116. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d).
117. Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,205, 16,206
(1987).
118. .tCLU, supra note 99, at 13 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c) (1982)) (in actions
brought by the United States, the statute of limitations is tolled for periods where
material facts are not known "by an official of the United States charged with the
responsibility to act in the circumstances").
119. 52 Fed. Reg. at 16,206.
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quire that a determination of the nonimmigrant's illegal status
have been made beforeJanuary 1, 1982; it merely requires that
his status was "known to the Government" as of that date. '2 0
Thus, because the INS is responsible for the administration
and enforcement of the Act, 12 it will ultimately be charged with
determining whether or not the alien's status was illegal. This
determination can easily be made by examining relevant docu-
mentation from any federal governmental agency or depart-
ment.
2 2
2. The Purpose of the Legalization Program
In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law and
to its object and policy.
Roger B. Taney 1
23
The Chevron Court, by reviewing the legislative history of
the act at issue,'2 4 followed the ancient axiom that "statutes
should be interpreted so that the manifested purpose or object
can be accomplished."'' 25
The legislative history of the Act provides two clearly
stated purposes behind the legalization provision: first, to pro-
vide the INS with a "clean slate"' 26 by legalizing eligible aliens
and thus allowing INS resources to be used more appropri-
ately for the prevention of future illegal immigration; 27 and
120. Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 11, Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp.
690 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (Civ. A. No. CA 3-87-0256-G) (available at the Fordham Intenia-
tional Law Journal office); ACLU, supra note 99, at 13; NTIC, supra note 99, at 4.
121. See 8 U.S.C. § I 103(a) (1982). Under the direction of the Attorney Gen-
eral, the INS administers and enforces all laws relating to immigration and naturali-
zation of aliens, except as otherwise provided. Id.
122. AILA, supra note 99, at 111-1.
123. United States v. Heirs of Boisdor6, 49 U.S. 116, 125, 8 How. 113, 122
(1850), quoted in Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353, 358 (1986).
124. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 845 (1984).
125. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.06 (Sands 4th
ed. 1984) (citing Heydon's case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584)).
126. 132 CONG. REC. S16,911 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Haw-
kins).
127. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 16-17. See generally Smith, lItro-
ductio,, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1982, at 3, 7 (in the introduction to an issue
devoted to U.S. immigration policy. Attorney General William French Smith dis-
cusses the policy reasons behind proposed amnesty legislation).
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second, to end the exploitation by criminals, employers, or
landlords of "a class of individuals who now must hide in the
shadows."' 8  To accomplish these purposes, Congress in-
tended a "liberal and generous" implementation of the legali-
zation provision of the Act. 129 The legalization provision is
clearly remedial in nature 30 and thus, when Congress uses
broad language-such as "known to the Government"-that
language should be interpreted generously, in favor of those
whom the statute was designed to benefit. 13'
Those applying for eligibility under the "known to the
Government" requirement are members of a subcategory of all
illegal aliens applying for legalization.1 32 Each individual le-
galized under this section is one individual fewer who must
"hide in the shadows," 133 and one individual fewer whom the
INS has to worry about deporting. Furthermore, under a more
generous interpretation, processing the applications of these
individuals should be as easy as processing those of any appli-
cant for legalization.' 34
C. A More Reasonable Interpretation
The present INS interpretation of "known to the Govern-
ment" contradicts the plain meaning and ordinary usage of the
words themselves, 35 is inconsistent with the documentation
purpose underlying the phrase, 36 and is contrary to the pur-
poses behind the entire legalization provision.3 7
128. Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon Signing S.1200, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1534 (Nov. 10, 1986); see also supra text accompanying notes 15-16
(discussing purposes of the Act). See generally Smith, supra note 127.
129. HousE REPORT, supra note 13, pt. 1, at 72, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5676.
130. Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Bailey v.
Brooks, No. C886-1914 R, Order Granting Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 15, 1986) (available at Fordham International Law Journal office).
131. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977); Cia.
Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 428 (ist Cir. 1985);
Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co., 373 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1967).
132. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 sec. 201, § 245A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a (Supp. IV 1986).
133. Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon Signing S.1200, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1534 (Nov. 10, 1986).
134. AIL4, supra note 99, at III-l.
135. See supra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 113-22.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 126-34.
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A definition that is both reasonable and consistent with
the plain language of the Act has been suggested by the Ameri-
can Immigration Lawyers Association: a nonimmigrant would
be "presumptively eligible for legalization" if the alien was in
violation of the terms of his visa before January 1, 1982; and,
on or before January 1, 1982, "through the normal operations
of the Federal Government, some Federal agency or officer
was on notice of the actions that violated visa status."'' 3
8
This interpretation would conform with the plain meaning
of "known to the Government"'' 3 9 by broadly defining "Gov-
ernment" as any federal agency or officer, and "known" as to
be on notice.' 4 ° Congressional concerns regarding reliable
documentation 4 ' would be allayed because federal documents
would still be required for proof that the nonimmigrant was in
violation of his visa before January 1, 1982.142
This broader definition would allow more individuals to
qualify for legalization and thus would help to accomplish the
purposes behind the legalization provision. 4 3 This definition
would free the INS to concentrate on present and future viola-
tions;"14 it would also free more individuals from exploitation
and allow them to contribute openly to society.1
4 5
CONCLUSION
The INS's interpretation of "known to the Government"
is inconsistent with the plain, unambiguous, meaning of the
words. Furthermore, it is an impermissible construction be-
cause the legislative history of the Act shows it to be unreason-
able within the context of the clear purposes behind the legali-
zation provision. To conform more faithfully with the clear
statutory language and the remedial purposes behind the le-
138. AILA, supra note 99, at III-l.
139. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
140. AILA, supra note 99, at III-1.
141. See supra text accompanying note 114.
142. AILA, supra note 99, at III-1.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 120-28.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 120-2 1.
145. HousE REPORT, supra note 13, pt. 1, at 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5653.
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galization provision, the INS should adopt a broader defini-
tion.
Carl Stine*
[As this Note was going to press, Judge Stanley Sporkin of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued
a memorandum opinion and order holding that the INS's reg-
ulations regarding "known to the Government" are contrary to
the law.** In his lengthy opinion, Judge Sporkin, following
the Chevron methodology, held that both the plain meaning of
the statutory language and the legislative history of the Act re-
veal a clear congressional intent that is contrary to the INS's
narrow interpretation. In granting the plaintiff's motion for
declaratory judgment, Judge Sporkin interpreted the word
"Government," in this context, to mean the United States gov-
ernment and not merely the INS. Additionally, he enjoined
the further application of the regulations and ordered the INS
to take specific remedial actions.***]
* J.D. candidate, 1989, Fordham University
** Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, No. 88-0625, slip op. at 39, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2729, at 54 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1988) (memorandum opinion and order).
*** Id.
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